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Abstract 
We provide an analytical-behavioral explanation for the observed positive relationship 
between income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, and the incentive to migrate. 
We show that a higher total relative deprivation of a population leads to a stronger incentive 
to engage in migration for a given level of a population’s income; that total relative 
deprivation is positively related to the Gini coefficient; and that, consequently, the Gini 
coefficient and migration are positively correlated, holding the population’s income constant. 
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1. Prelude 
 
“A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small, 
it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, the 
house shrinks into a hut.” Karl Marx. 1849. Wage Labour and Capital. Chapter 6. Quoted 
from the edition: New York: International Publishers, 1933, p. 30. 
 
 
2. Motivation and a stylized fact 
 
There are not many topics that have so attracted the attention and consumed the 
passion of economists as inequality (of incomes) and its interactions with other variables of 
interest. It is somewhat surprising then that the relationship between migration and inequality 
at origin or at destination has not been studied intensively. Certainly, key issues such as how 
the repercussions of migration, especially migrants’ remittances, impinge on the inequality in 
the distribution of income by size at origin, or how the degree of income inequality at 
destination renders a destination differentially attractive to workers of different skill levels, 
were studied closely some time ago, both theoretically and empirically. (Several chapters in 
Stark (1993) address the first of these topics,  Borjas (1987) studies the second.) Yet evidence 
as to whether, ceteris paribus, a higher degree of income inequality promotes or hinders 
migration is not easy to come by, and no analytical-behavioral foundation is at present 
available that could lead us to expect the evidence to unveil one type of a relationship or 
another.  
 
A recent data set and a new study that builds on the data set contribute significantly to 
our sparse knowledge. The 1995 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted a 
survey of approximately 28,000 individuals in 23 countries that included the question 
“Would you be willing to move to another country to improve your work or living 
conditions?” Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) ingeniously related the responses to this question 
to a battery of country variables including income inequality, as measured by the standard 
Gini coefficient. An important finding of Liebig and Sousa-Poza’s analysis is that 
“controlling for GNP per capita …, the Gini coefficient always has a positive and highly 
significant impact [on the propensity to migrate]. A higher income inequality thus leads 
ceteris paribus to higher incentives to migrate.” (Liebig and Sousa-Poza, p. 137). Why such a 
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relationship? Why, ceteris paribus, would there be more migration from an economy where 
the incomes are 1 and 3 than from an economy where the incomes are 2 and 2? The notion 
that the incentive to migrate of the individuals whose incomes rise from 2 to 3 is attenuated 
by less than the incentive to migrate of the individuals whose incomes decline from 2 to 1 is 
amplified, is a description, not an analytical-behavioral explanation. The purpose of this note 
is to propose such an explanation.  
 
 
3. An explanation 
 
In a series of articles, we have argued that relative deprivation impinges positively on 
the propensity to migrate. Briefly summarized, the argument is that individuals care about 
their relative position, and that a change in group affiliation is a response to a low relative 
position in a group (or in a population). Of course, this is not the only feasible response. 
Given the group of individuals with whom comparisons are made, discontent that arises from 
having an income that is lower than the income of other members of the group could induce 
harder work without exiting the group (Stark, 1990). Yet it could also induce a departure for 
work elsewhere where incomes are higher without changing the set of individuals with whom 
comparisons are made, or it could prompt severing of the ties with the offensive set, leaving it 
in order to associate with another set even if incomes are held constant. These latter two 
responses - holding the reference group constant with migration conferring a gain in income 
and thereby reducing relative deprivation, or holding incomes constant with migration 
conferring a lowering-of-relative-deprivation gain through a substitution of reference groups 
have been modeled theoretically and tested empirically (Stark 1993; Stark and Wang 2000, 
2005).  
 
A measure of relative deprivation developed in our earlier work, indeed a definition of 
relative deprivation, is the proportion of those in the individual’s group whose incomes are 
higher than the individual’s times their mean excess income. It can be shown1 that the relative 
deprivation of an individual whose income is w, is  
∫
∞
−=>−−≡
w
dxxFwxwxEwFwRD ,)](1[)|()](1[)(  
                                                          
1 The proof is in Appendix 1. 
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where F(x) is the cumulative distribution of income in the reference group of the individual 
whose income is w. Given that the propensity to migrate by an individual whose relative 
deprivation is high is stronger than the propensity to migrate by an individual whose relative 
deprivation is low, we would naturally anticipate that a group (a population) exhibiting a high 
aggregate level of relative deprivation will be more inclined to engage in migration (more 
likely to produce migrants) than a group (a population) exhibiting a low aggregate level of 
relative deprivation. It is possible to sum up the individual relative deprivations in order to 
obtain a measure of the population-wide level of relative deprivation, TRD. And it is further 
possible to show that this measure is positively related to the Gini coefficient of inequality of 
the distribution of income, G.2  Specifically, it is shown in Appendix 2 that  
∑
=
= n
i
iw
TRDG
1
 
 
where  is the level of income of individual i, i=1,…,n. iw
 
 In the example of two individuals whose incomes are (2,2), TRD=G=0, whereas if the 
incomes of the two individuals are (1 , 3), TRD=1 and 41=G .When incomes are (1 , 3), the 
individual whose income is 1 rather than 2 is relatively deprived while previously he was not, 
the individual whose income is 3 rather than 2 was not, and is not, relatively deprived, and 
the group as a whole exhibits more relative deprivation, a higher Gini coefficient, and, we 
expect, a stronger inclination to migrate.  
 
 Our finding is further exemplified upon considering a setting of three individuals 
wherein the total level of income of the group is constant. Let there be the following three 
configurations of income: 
 
 
P1 = ( 1/10 , 45/100 , 45/100 ); 
P2 = ( 1/10 , 4/10 , 5/10 ); 
P3 = ( 1/10 , 3/10 , 6/10 ).
 
                                                          
2 The proof is in Appendix 2. 
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Since  , we have that G=TRD= ∑
=
=
3
1
1
i
iw iP∀ 7/30 for P1; G=TRD= 8/30 for P2; and G=TRD= 
10/30 for P3. In all three configurations, the individual with income 1/10 is equally relatively 
deprived and hence will have the same propensity to migrate. But the Gini coefficient is not 
equal across all configurations. As constructed, there is a higher Gini coefficient in P3 than in 
P2 and, indeed, a higher relative deprivation for the second individual in P3 than in P2 – hence 
a stronger inclination by him to migrate. Thus, we infer that a higher Gini coefficient is 
associated with a stronger inclination to migrate in order to reduce relative deprivation for the 
group as a whole, even though the higher TRD does not arise from a higher relative 
deprivation for all the individuals concerned. Since a higher TRD reflects a stronger incentive 
to engage in migration for a given level of a population’s income, it follows that the Gini 
coefficient and migration will be positively correlated, holding the population’s income 
constant. 
 
 
4. Alternative explanations and an empirically-verifiable distinction 
 
The argument of this note differs in its perspective and prediction from an argument 
that conditions the negative selectivity of migration on a comparison between the degree of 
income inequality at origin and the degree of income inequality at destination (cf. Borjas). 
The present argument is that as a consequence of the prevalence of relative deprivation at 
origin, migration will be negatively selected, independently of the said comparison. 
Specifically, Borjas argues that if “the [destination country] has a more unequal income 
distribution than the home country” “[a] positive selection [will] take place” (pp. 551-552). 
The implication of the argument advanced in this note, however, is that negative selection, 
prompted by relative deprivation at origin, will not be reversed upon the incorporation of 
such a ranking of the income distributions. Similarly, while Borjas maintains that “If the 
income distribution in the sending country is more unequal than that of the [destination 
country] … emigrants will be chosen from the lower tail of the income distribution in the 
country of origin” (p. 552, first emphasis added), this note advances the view that the 
negative selectivity arises from the inequality of the income distribution at origin per se, not 
from the inequality of the income distribution at origin being higher or lower than the 
inequality of the income distribution at destination. 
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An implication of the argument of this note is that an observed negative selectivity 
will become more pronounced upon the income distribution at origin becoming more unequal 
given the destination country’s income distribution. Or equivalently, that the income 
distribution at destination becoming more equal while the origin income distribution 
remaining as unequal as before will not dampen the relative deprivation inducement to 
migrate of low-income members of the origin population. 
 
To illustrate, let the income distributions at origin and destination be ( )1 ε, 4 ε− + , 
 ε , and (2 , 8), respectively. Incomes at origin are more unequally distributed than 
incomes at destination (assuming that the degree of income inequality is measured by the 
Gini coefficient). The relative deprivation theory postulates an incentive to migrate for the 
individual whose income is 1 . Suppose that the incomes at origin are redistributed such 
that the new income distribution is (1 , 4). There is no difference now in the degrees of income 
inequality across the two distributions. The “conditional selectivity” theory is silent with 
regard to the sign of the selectivity; the relative deprivation approach is not: while at the wake 
of the substitution of a more equal income distribution for a less equal income distribution at 
origin the relative deprivation incentive of the low-income individual to migrate is weakened, 
migration will continue to be from the lower tail of the distribution (in spite of the income 
distribution at origin not being more unequal than the income distribution at destination). 
ε 0> 0→
ε−
 
Thus, there is an empirically-verifiable distinction between the relative deprivation 
approach and the “conditional selectivity” theory. 
 
 
5. The underlying research 
 
The idea that externalities impinge asymmetrically on individuals’ wellbeing and 
behavior has been with us for many years.  Early proponents of this idea were of the opinion 
that the wellbeing of individuals rose in what they had and declined in what more prosperous 
people had. References of pioneering works that come readily to mind are Duesenberry (1949) 
who argued that individuals look up but not down when making comparisons, Stouffer et al. 
(1949) who, in spite of studying a quite different behavior, independently argued likewise, 
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and Davis (1966) who observed that in choosing higher performance career fields, which 
generally require graduate training, students in colleges and universities in the US were 
heavily influenced by their subjectively assessed relative standing in their college or 
university rather than by the subjective quality of the institution, and that they adjusted their 
career choices in a manner corresponding to their subjective (relative) standing in their 
college or university, tilting towards the low performance fields as their relative standing 
declined.3 (As social psychologists, Stouffer et al. and Davis have carefully searched for the 
relevant set of individuals with whom comparisons are made – the reference group.) A recent 
manifestation of the asymmetric externalities idea takes the diametrically opposite view that 
while the utility of an individual rises in his own consumption, it declines in the consumption 
of any of his neighbors if that consumption falls below some minimal level; individuals are 
adversely affected by the material wellbeing of others in their reference group when this 
wellbeing is sufficiently lower than theirs (Andolfatto, 2002).  Our impression though is that 
in the course of the intervening five decades, the bulk of the theoretical work has held the 
view that individuals look up and not down, and that the evidence has overwhelmingly 
supported the “upward comparison” view.4 (Helpful references are provided and reviewed in 
Frey and Stutzer (2002), in Walker and Smith (2002), and in Luttmer (2004).). The argument 
of this note draws on this perspective.  
 
                                                          
3 Notably, students judged themselves by their “local standing” in their own college or university (that is, 
standing within their reference group) rather than across colleges or universities (that is, across reference 
groups). This self-assessment and the resulting response implied that being a “big frog in a small pond” or a 
“small frog in a big pond” mattered even when the absolute size of the “frog” did not change. Davis 
concluded that when parents who aspire their son to opt for a higher-performance career field send their son to 
a “fine” college or university, “a big pond,” they face a risk of him ending up assessing himself as a “small 
frog” thereby ending up not choosing a desirable career path.  
 
4 For example, it has been argued that given the set of individuals with whom comparisons are made, an 
unfavorable comparison could induce harder work. This idea is captured and developed in the literature on 
performance incentives in career games and other contests. (Early studies include Lazear and Rosen (1981), 
Rosen (1986), and Stark (1990).) Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) provide evidence that 
individuals strongly dislike being in an income distribution in which “comparison persons” earn more. Clark 
and Oswald (1996) present evidence that “comparison incomes” have a significant negative impact on overall 
job satisfaction. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 We provide a proof that relative deprivation, RD, can be written either as 
 or as [ ][ ]∫
∞
−
w
dxxF  )(1 ).|()(1 wxwxwF >−Ε⋅−  
 
 From integration by parts we obtain that  
 
[ ] [ ]∫ ∫
∞ ∞
∞ +−=−
w w
w dxxxfxxFdxxF .)(| )(1 )(1  
 
Since, as shown below, [ ] 0 )(1lim =−∞→ xxFx  and since )()(1
1)|( xf
wF
wxxf −=> , it 
follows that  
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]∫ ∫
∞ ∞
>−+−−=−
w w
dxwxxxfwFwwFdxxF )|()(1 )(1 )(1  
 
[ ] [ ]wwxxwF −>Ε⋅−= )|()(1  
 
[ ] ).|()(1 wxwxwF >−Ε⋅−=  
 
 
In order to show that  [ ] 0 )(1lim =−∞→ xxFx , we note that  
 
,)|(|)()(1 2x
VarXxXPxXPxF ≤≥≤≥=−  
 
where the last inequality is Chebyshev’s inequality. Upon multiplying the end sides by x and 
taking limits we obtain that for a finite variance:  
 
[ ] .0lim)(1lim0 =≤−≤ ∞→∞→ x
VarXxFx
xx
     □
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Appendix 2 
 
 We provide a proof that the aggregate, population-wide relative deprivation, TRD, is 
equal to the population’s income times the Gini coefficient of inequality of the distribution of 
income.  We refer to the discrete case. 
 
 Let the levels of income of the n individuals who constitute the population be ordered: 
 
 
}....{ 21 nwwwW ≤≤≤=  
 
Define the relative deprivation of an individual whose income level is 
as   1 ..., 2, ,1  , −= niwi
 
∑
+=
−= n
ij
iji wwn
wRD
1
)(1)(  
 
where it is understood that .0)( =nwRD  
 
Therefore, the aggregate relative deprivation is 
 
∑ ∑−
= +=
−= 1
1 1
).(1
n
i
n
ij
ij wwn
TRD  
 
The Gini coefficient is defined as 
 
w
ww
nG
n
i
n
j
ji∑∑= = −= 1 12
||
2
1
 
 
 where .1
1
∑
=
= n
i
iwn
w  
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Since 
∑∑ ∑ ∑
= =
−
= +=
−=−n
i
n
j
n
i
n
ij
ijji wwww
1 1
1
1 1
),(2||  
  
it follows that 
 
∑ ∑−
= +=
−= 1
1 1
2 )(22
1 n
i
n
ij
ij wwn
Gw  
 
   ,)(1
1
1 1
2 ∑ ∑
−
= +=
−= n
i
n
ij
ij wwn
 
 
or that 
 
∑ ∑∑ −
= +==
=−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ 1
1 11
)(1
n
i
n
ij
ij
n
i
i TRDwwn
Gw .     □ 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
References 
Andolfatto, D., 2002, A theory of inalienable property rights, Journal of Political Economy 
110, 382-393. 
Borjas, G., 1987, Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants, American Economic Review 
77, 531-553. 
Clark, A.E. and A.J. Oswald, 1996, Satisfaction and comparison income, Journal of Public 
Economics 61, 359-381. 
Davis, J.A., 1966, The campus as a frog pond: an application of the theory of relative 
deprivation to career decisions of college men, American Journal of Sociology 72, 17-
31. 
Duesenberry, J.S., 1949, Income, savings and the theory of consumer behavior (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA). 
Frey, B.S. and A. Stutzer, 2002, Happiness and economics: how the economy and institutions 
affect human well-being (Princeton University Press, Princeton). 
Lazear, E.P. and S. Rosen, 1981, Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts, Journal 
of Political Economy 89, 841-864. 
Liebig, T. and A. Sousa-Poza, 2004, Migration, self-selection and income inequality: an 
international analysis, Kyklos 57, 125-146.  
Loewenstein, G.F., L. Thompson and M.H. Bazerman, 1989, Social utility and decision 
making in interpersonal contexts, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, 
426-441. 
Luttmer, E.F.P., 2004, Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 10667, Cambridge, MA. 
Rosen, S., 1986, Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments, American Economic 
Review 76, 701-715. 
 10 
 
 
Stark, O., 1990, A relative deprivation approach to performance incentives in career games 
and other contests, Kyklos 43, 211-227. 
Stark, O., 1993, The migration of labor (Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, MA). 
Stark, O. and Y.Q. Wang, 2000, A theory of migration as a response to relative deprivation, 
German Economic Review 1, 131-143.  
Stark, O. and Y.Q. Wang, 2005, Towards a theory of self-segregation as a response to relative 
deprivation: steady-state outcomes and social welfare, in: L. Bruni and P.L. Porta, eds., 
Economics and happiness: framing the analysis (Oxford University Press (in press), 
Oxford).  
Stouffer, S.A., E.A. Suchman, L.C. Devinney, S.A. Star and R.M. Williams Jr., 1949, The 
american soldier: adjustment during army life (Princeton University Press, Princeton). 
Walker, I. and H.J. Smith, 2002, Relative deprivation: specification, development, and 
integration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
 
 
 11 
 
 
  
Author:  Oded Stark 
 
Title:  Inequality and Migration: A Behavioral Link 
 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series 178 
 
Editor: Robert M. Kunst (Econometrics) 
Associate Editors: Walter Fisher (Macroeconomics), Klaus Ritzberger (Microeconomics)  
 
ISSN: 1605-7996 
© 2005 by the Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna •  +43 1 59991-0 • Fax +43 1 59991-555 • http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
  
ISSN: 1605-7996 
